Abstract -Protection schemes are modelled through Petri Nets, in order to carry out performance evaluation.
INTRODUCTION
When a fault occurs in a power system, the protective relaying scheme has to carry out the tasks of detecting the fault,and isolating it, These tasks must be carried out reliably, with the minimum delay, and with minimum disruption of supply to the consumer loads. Traditionally, protection engineers have used their knowledge of the character of the power system, and a set of design rules,in order to design its protection scheme. With the development of very complex power systems, which have very stringent performance requirements, it is desirable that tools be developed for the systematic design of the protective schemes of such systems, as well as for the performance evaluation of alternative protection schemes. [1,2,31 Petri Net models are a means of representing protection schemes; they enable one to ensure that these schemes possess desirable qualities, they permit the comparison of different schemes, they enable one to specify coordination requirements between the timing parameters of the primary and backup protection, and they can be used for performance evaluation. The Petri Net model enables one to study the protection scheme independent of the dynamics of the power system.
In this paper, we will establish the relevance of Petri Net modelling to protection studies; we will illustrate how the different Petri Net models capture the information that is of importance to both qualitative and quantitative evaluation of protection schemes. The marked Petri Nets allow one to evaluate conservativeness, safeness and properness: Time Petri Nets are able to represent the timing parameters of protection schemes, and serve as a tool for the establishment of relationships between these parameters, in order that the coordination between primary and backup protection is ensured. An alternative means of representing timing information is the timed Petri Net, which is useful in the computation of the cycle times of the operational cycles of protection schemes. Stochastic Petri Nets adequately represent the stochastic nature of protection; we will demonstrate their advantage over simulation techniques as a means of computing the mean sojourn time and the steady state probability of occupancy of each state of the protection scheme.
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A paper recommenlled and apsroveil by tile 1333 Power Systen Relaying C o x l i t t e e of t i e IEEX Power 3n;;ineering Society f o r pre :enbation -it t h e 1990 IEEEE/PhS I n t e r n a t i o n a l Power iieetin:-India, ,Tew Delhi. I n d i a , October 26 -'lover, ier 1. 1990. the qualitative performance measures of petri Nets were developed for the modelling of &mpl;ter systems and comnunication protocols [ 4~5 1 -3ucn systems are discrete -event systems; in such systems the state remains unchanged, until an event takes place, thereby causing the system to instantaneously switch to a different state. Although -the power system itself i s a continuous time system, its protection scheme may De viewed as a discrete/event system, and modelled through Petri Nets. The occurrence of a fault is a discrete event which instantaneously changes the power system from a fault-free condition to a faulted condition. Similarly the clearing of a fault and the resetting of a relay are discrete events which change the state.
Although formal definitions of Petri Nets (PN's) are available [61, we will find it convenient to visualize a PN as a directed bipartite graph, in which there are two disjoint sets of nodes, and two disjoint sets of edges. The set of n place nodes P=(pl,p2, ...,p n) are represented by circles, and the set of m transition nodes T=(tl,t2,. . .,tm)are represented by bars, as shown in Fig.1 , where n=4 and m=3. The directed edges IN are incident out of place nodes and into transition nodes; individual members of this set are denoted by IN(pi,tj). The directed edges OUT are incident out of transition nodes and into place nodes; members of this set are denoted by OUT(pi,tj). In Fig.1 , the set IN consists o f 5 edges, and the set OUT has 6 edges. The set of input nodes of a transition tj is the set of places pi for which IN(pi,tj) is a member of IN; similarly, the set of output nodes is the set of places pi for which OUT(pi,tj) is a member of OUT. In Fig.1 , the set of input places for transition tl is [p3,p4] , and the set of output places is [pl,p2] .
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Fig.1. Petri Net
The topological information of each PN graph is contained in its incidence matrix, C, which has n rows and m columns. The element C [i,j] has the value -1 if the place pi is an input node of transition tj, it has a 85 Reachability is a useful concept of marked PNs. Eachi initial marking Mo has a reachability set associated with it; this set consists,.of all the markings which can be reached from MO through the firing of one or more transitions.
value t1 if place pi is an output node of transition tj, and it has a value of 0 otherwise. The incidence matrix of the PN of Obviously, C is defined only if no node is both an input node and an output node of the same transition.
As it will be shown in the next section, the iincidence matrix is useful for checking whether the marked PN of a protection scheme is conservative; sthis will guarantee that the scheme possesses the, property of conservativeness. The incidence matrix; will also be shown to be of relevance in detecting the cycles in the PN model, thereby facilitating the evaluation of the cycle times of the protection scheme.
MARKED PETRI NETS
The marked PN consists of a PN graph G, along with a marking, M. This marking associates with each place pi a non-negative integral number mi of tokens, as represented by mi dots at the node pi. This marking is expressed as an n-vector, whose i th compoynt is mi. ---
F i g . 2 . M a r k e d PN of Protection Scheme
Since no place can have a negative number of tokens, transitioa is not allowed to fire if any of its input places do not ! have at least one token. If arty transitiorhas a token at each of its input places,,then it is said to be 'endbled'; only' enabled transitions may fire. For instance, when one has the marking shown in Fig 2, the only enabled transition is tl. Each time a transition fires, it changes the marking, thereby enabling some more transitions, and disabling some others. For the PN of Fiq2, the firing of tl produces the marking (O,l,l,l,O,O) , in which only t2 and t3 are enabled.
If t2 fires, then we get the marking (O,O,O,l,l,O~, in which only t4 is enabled; the firing of t4 returns the PN to the original marking (l,l,O,l~O,O~ Otherwise, if t3 fires, the marking' (O,l,O,O,O,l~is produced; then t5 fires, to return the PN Ro the original marking.
Each marking which can be reached from the initial marking is referred to as a state. The reachability information is represented through a reachability graph, in which each node corresponds to a state, and the edges are associated with transitions. A directed edge is incident out of node M1 and into node M2 if and only if there exists a transition ti whose firing changes the initial marking M1 to the marking M2; the edge bears the label is given in Fig 3. Reachability graphs enables us to find the reachability set of any state Mi; one merely locates all the nodes which can be reached from Mi by the traversal of directed paths. In the representation of protection schemes through marked PNs, one maps each condition to a place node, and each event to a transition node; the initial marking is obtained by depositing a token in every place node which corresponds to an initial condition of the protection scheme.
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Fig. 4. Over current Relaying Scheme
In the overcurrent relaying scheme of Fig 4 ,the primary relay R1 trips breaker B1, to isolate the fault F1; relay R2 and breaker 82 correspond to backup protection. This scheme is modelled through the PN of
The>itialsndigcns are the absence of the fault, and the readiness of the relays R1 and R2 to respond to it; these correspond to the places ply p2 and p4 respectively. A token is deposited at each of these places, as shown in Fig. 2 , to represent the initial condition. The other possible conditionk of the protestion s -y ' t e m are the presence of Fly and its being isolated through B1 and 82 respectively these conditions correspond to p3, p5 and p6. The occurrence of F1 is represented by the transition tl, which deposits a token at p3, to indicate that the fault is present. The new state (0,1,1,1,0,0~~ is as shown in Fig. 3 . Now t2 and t3, corresponding to primary and backup relay operation respectively are both enabled. If t2 fires, then a token is deposited at p5, and the system can be restored through primary protection, corresponding to the firing of t4, with the initial state being reached, as shown in Fig. 3. If t3 fires, then restoration through backuo orotection takes olace, as reoresented bv the firing df t5.
A protection scheme is conservative C7l if it does not lose any information which is of' relevance to protection, and if it does not generate any spurious information. This information consists of the presence of faults and the readiness of the protection elements to respond to faults. Since the marked PN represents these conditions through tokens in the place nodes, the protection scheme will be conservative if its marked PN model cannot either lose or generate tokens. This is the conservativeness property of PN's. A PN has this property if there exist positive integers wl,w2, such that for every transition tj, the markings M &Iy? prior to and after the firing of tj satisfy the relationship .
This property can be determined from the incidence matrix C. If one can find a vector Y, all of whose components are positive integers, such that C'Y=O, then the PN has the conservativeness property. In the #ase of the PN of Fig 2, we can choose Y=~1,1,1,1,2,2) to satisfy this condition, and hence the protection scheme of Fig 4 is conservative. It has been shown [81 that unless care is taken to save all relevant information, one may not obtain conservativeness in more complicated protection schemes.
A protection scheme is proper if it has the ability to return to its normal condition after it has experienced a fault. Since the normal condition corresponds to the initial marking of the PN model, the scheme will be proper if for each state that belongs to the reachability set of the initial state in the PN model, there exists a sequence of transitions whose firing will return the system from this state to the, linitial state. This is the properness property of marked PN's.
In the reachability graph of Fig. 3 , there is a directed path of transition edges from each other state to the initial state. Hence the PN of Fig.  2 has the properness property, and the protection scheme of Fig. 4 is proper.
The third qualitative performance measure is safeness. A protection scheme is safe if there can never be an attempt to reset a relay which has already been reset. In the marked PN model, the resetting of a relay is represented by the depositing of a token in the appropriate place node; hence, safeness of the protection scheme i s guaranteed if no sequence of transitions can deposit a token in any relay place node when it already has a token; this is the safeness property of the relay places of the PN model, which can be expressed as
where pi is a relay place.
In Fig 2, the relay places are p2 and p4. From the reachability graph of Fig 3, it can be seen that for every state,both M(p2) and M(p4) are equal to either 0 or 1, and hence they have the safeness property. Hence the protection scheme of Fig 4 is safe.
RECOVERABILITY ANALYSIS
The Time Petri Net is of relevance to recoverability analysis. This PN employs the graph structure and tokens of the marked PN, along with additional timing information [9] While it has the same restriction that only enabled transitions may f ire, there are additional constraints on the firing interval. Whenever a transition ti is enabled (by the firing of some other transition tj), at least Tmin,i time units must elapse before ti is allowed to fire; if it has not fired before the instant Tmax,i (measured from the instant of enabling), then at Tmax,i it must fire.
We will use recoverability analysis to obtain the timing relationship between the primary and backup protection for the protection scheme of Fig 4. We use the time PN of Fig 5, which has a more detailed graph than that of Fig 2, we represent only the primary protection
The places pl through p8 correspond respectively to the condition of absence o f a fault, re'lay able to sense the fault, relay set, fault present, trin signal sent, fault isolated, system ready for t l From Fig 5, we see that p4 receives a token at the same instant as does p2, and hence t4 is enabled as soon as' 6 receives a token. From the loops of the graph, one'$ets
If thts relationship is satisfied, then the relay is ready to r.espond to a fault whenever it can occur. Failure occurs if the malfunction I % a relay prevents it from detecting a fault; this is simulated by the loss of a token from place p2. Such behaviour is analyzed through an error token machine (ETM). The ETM of Fig 6 is obtained from the reachability graph of the PN of Fig  5 by the addition of the node (p3,p4), and the edge p2, which is incident out of node (p2,p3,p4) and into node (p3,p4); the edge shown with dotted lines will temporarily be ignored. State (p3,p4)is illegal, since it is reached by traversing the edge p2, which correspond to the illegal operation of the loss of a token; it is also a final state, because there are no edges (transitions) incident out of it Because the ETM has an illegal final state, recovery from the failure is not possible; this conforms with our understanding that a system with only primary protection cannot recover from the failure of the primary relay to respond [8] .
The introduction of the edge t7 in the ETM converts the illegal state (p3,p4) to a non-final state, thereby; facilitating recovery.
This transition t7 must f & P 3 , P4 P2,P3,P4
Fig. 7 . l i m e Petri Not o f Two-line System. W
and t22. and we require that t18 fires first, spurious breaker opening is prevented if one chooses Tmaxl8 to be The firing of t7 activates the backup protection, by replacing the lost token in p2. Rather than complicate the PN model by introducing new places and transitions to correspond to backup protection, we use the ones that correspond to primary protection, with the understanding that after t7 fires, the timing parameters of transitions t2 through t6 will
Similarly,one selects a transition t28 to prevent the spurious tripping of line 1 when a fault occurs only on line 2. It has been shown [8] that in the comparatively infrequent case of occurrence of simultaneous faults on both the lines, the fault clearance will be delayed, but the behaviour of the system will be correct.
The interwetation o f transition t18 is that when correspond to backup protection. the relay on line 2 senses a fault,it ignores it Since backup p rotection not be actuated (removes the token) if it senses that the breaker on before the primary protection has had sufficient time to line has opened (token at p16). Hence maloperation is act, transition t7 must always take longer to fire than prevented only if the relay on line has information the largest possible time taken by the sequence t 2~t 3~t 4 with regard to the status of the breaker on line 1.
CYCLE TIME EVALUATION Tmin77 [TmaxZ t Tmax3 t Tmax41
--where these parameters refer to primary protection. This constraint is consistent with known coordination ,criteria, and demonstrates the relevance of time PN model 1 ing.
We next consider a more complicated system, in which there are two parallel lines. Under light load, their protection schemes are independent. However, under heavy loads the tripping of the breaker on line 1 will overload line 2, perhaps causing it to trip, although it is fault-free. This undesirable behaviour must be avoided. We analyze the situation through the time PN of Fig 7, which is obtained by duplicating Fig 6, and using the additional index to distinguish the places and transitions of line 1 from those of line 2; for now,transition t18 will be ignored. nder light load,protection against a fault on line 1 d simulated through the firin_g of transitions tll through t17. Under heavy load, a fault on line 1 overloads line 2; this spurious behaviour is simulated by the depositing of a spurious token at p22 at the instant of the firing of t13. If there has been no fault on line 2, then p24 has no token, because t21 has not fired. The illegal token enables t22, whose firing corresponds to the illegal issue of a trip signal from the primary relay on line 2. To prevent this, one must remove the extra token from p22 by firing t18. Since the firing o f t13 has simultaneously enabled t14, t18
Every protection scheme has a collection o f operational cycles associated with it. Each relay is initially set; when a fault occurs within its zone of protection, it senses the fault, issues a trip signal, and then resets, thereby completing a cycle of operation.
The power system itself has cyclic behaviour; it passes from the normal state to the faulted state, after which the fault is sensed and cleared, and then restoration takes place, once again obtaining normal operation. Cycle times can be associated with these cycles. The cycle times are a quantitative performance measure o f the protection scheme. Since the time taken to locate and clear a fault will depend on its nature and location, the cycle time is not constant, but an estimate of the minimum value could be obtained from a Timed Petri Net model
The timed PN has the same topological structure the marked PN, along with a single time parameter ;: being associated with each place pi. In the timed PN model, whenever a token is deposited in a place pi, it remains inactive in this place for an interval of zi' time units, at the end of which it becomes available. A transition fires at the first instant that it has a token available at each of its input places. The timed PN model of the protection scheme of Fig 4 is Although in this case, it is easy to ideTitify the cycles of the PN, we will use the more general approach of computing them from the incidence matrix C, which.ps given by _ _ _ Let us consider any solution X to the equation CX=O; this solution X is known as a transition invariant or Tinvariant of the PN. In particular, let us select all such transitions whose entries are either 0 or 1. Each of these solutions corresponds to a set of transition whose firing returhs the PN to its original marking, thereby completing a cycle of operation. For instance, in this case the only two such T-invariants are (l,l,O,l,O,l,O~ and (l,O,l,O,l,O,l~ , and these correspond to the sets of transitions (tl t2,t4,t6) and (tl,t3,t5,t7) respectively.
Each of these sets of transitions can be used to construct a subnet, which consists of the corresponding transitions, and the places that are associated with them. The subnets of the PN of Fig 8 are shown in Fig  9. Each subnet itself consists of a number of cycles, and the minimum cycle time of the subnet can be obtained by computing the largest of the cycle times of these cycles, since the cycle of the subnet can complete only after all the cycles in it complete. The cycles within each subnet are identified from its incidence matrix, which is obtained by selecting the appropriate columns o f the incidence matrix C of the original PN.
For instance, the incidence matrix C1 and C2 of the subnets of Fig 9 are obtained by selecting the lst, 2nd,4th,6th and lst,3rd,5th,7th columns respectively of C, since; these correspond to the 1 entries o f the two selected T-, , invariants. The all-zero rows of C1 and C2 correspond to those; places that do not belong to the subnet; although their' entries do not help to identify the cycles, we retain, them, to maintain consistency of notation.
W ' FTg. 9 . Subnets of Timed Petri Net
The cycles qthin subnet 1 are obtained by solving the equation C1 Y=O, such that the entries of Y are either 0 or 1. In this c a v , the only two su solutions are [1,0,1,0,0,1,0,01 and [O,l.O,O,l,O,O,O~ the corresponding cycles are (pl,p3,p6) and (p2,p:) . For the other such subnet, one obtains the corresponding cycles (pl,p3,~7) and (~4,~8).
We now compute cycle time for the primary protection, which corresponds to the first subnet of Fig  9. In this subnet, the places are pl,pZ,p3,~5,p6, and their corresponding time parameters are zl,z2,z3,z5,z6 Specifically, we wish to find the minimum time that can elapse between the restoration of the system by the operation of the protection scheme, and the next occurrence of a fault, in order that it be handled by the primary protection, i.e the minimum possible value of zl. Since it must be ensured that the primary relay 89 has to be reset after it has responded to the previous fault, the maximum value of z2 and z5 are chosen on the basis of the physics of the protection scheme, in order to compute (z2tz5); this cycle time must be less than, or equal to the cycle time (zltz3tz6). We choose 23 and 26 to be respectively the maximum values of the breaker opening time and the fault clearing time, and thereby compute the value of zl. Similar computations for the backup protection use the cycles of the second subnet.
' STOCHASTIC FIUDELS
While the marked PN, time PN and timed PN do provide useful information with regard to protection schemes, they are deterministic models, and do not adequately reflect the stochastic nature of protection. The generalized stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) model provides a more realistic repr*ation [ll] . The GSPN has the same topology as the marked PN model with the firing times being random variables. The transitions are classified as immediate transitions and exponential transitions; immediate transitions must fire at the instant at which they are enabled, while the time that elapse between the enabling of an exponential transition and its firing is an exponentially distributed random variable.
The reachability graph of a GSPN is the same as that of the underlying marked PN; it i s assumed that the PN possesses the properties of boundedness and properness. The states of the system, as observed from the reachability graph, are categorized as either vanishing or tangible. If the marking of the state is such that an immediate transition is enabled, then it is a vanishing state, with the time spent in it being zero. Each tangible state is occupied for a finite, exponentially distributed interval of time. Computation performance involves the followinq steps:
the occupancy of the j th state, we compute the sum of the terms (m(k,j).qk), where m ( k j ) is mean sojourn time of state j in the k th cycle, the summation being over all cycles to which this state belongs; the ratio of this sum to R gives the desired steady-state probability.
We now illustrate these -computations for the protection scheme of Fig. 4 . Its stochastic PN model Is obtained by assigning transition rates and firing probabilities to the transition of Fig. 2 . The transition tl has a transition rate which is the reciprocal of the mean time to failure of the system. Transitions t2 and t3 have rates that are the reciprocal of the mean operating times of the relays and t4 and t5 use the reciprocal of the mean restoration rates. For the study, we will assume firing rates as shown in the REMC of Fig. 10 , which is obtained from the reachability graph of Fig. 3 . Transitions tl, t4 and t5 are the only possible transitions out of states Ml, M3 and M4 respectively, so they are assigned probabilities of 1. Transition t2 has firing probability equal to that of the operation of primary protection; we assume a value of 0.9. Obviously t3 has a corresponding value of 0.1. This system has no vanishing' states, so the REMC is identical to the EMC. Its states are-listed in Table 1 .
The reachability graph is obtained.
.. ' The embedded Markov chain (EMC) of the PN is found, by assigning to each edge of the reachability graph the firing rate of the corresponding transition. For inediate-transitions, the corresponding edges are appropriately marked. The vanishing states, which have an occupancy time of zero, are removed from the EMC, to produce a reduced embedded Markov chain (REMC) in which all edges Table 1 computed. The steady state probability distribution of tangible pl p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 mst ssp
The state M1 occurs in both cycles, with a mean sojourn time of 5. Hence the steady state probability of the system being normal is 5/7.75, or 0.645. The state M3 occurs in cycle 1 only, with probability 0.9, and mean sojourn time of 1.667, and hence its steady state probability is 0.9x1. 667/7.75, or 0.193 . Similarly, the steady state probability o f state M4 is (O.lx1.667)/7.75, or 0.022. State M2 occurs in cycle 1 with probability 0.9, and mean sojourn time 0.833, and in cycle 2 with probability 0.1 and mean sojourn time 3.333, Hence the steady state probability of M2 is given by (0.833~0.9+3.333~0.1)/7.75, or 0.140. These values have been entered in the last column of Table 1. CONCLUSION Petri Net models of power system protection schemes have been developed, and the relevance of these models to performance evaluation of the schemes has been demonstrated. While marked Petri Nets enable one to evaluate qua1 itative performance measures, time Petri Nets are useful in recoverability analysis, to obtain relationships between the time parameters of the protection scheme, Timed Petri Nets are a means of identifying the cycles of the protection scheme, and of computing the cycle times. Stochastic Petri Nets capture the stochastic nature of protection, and serve as a means of computing the statistics of protective operations. A number of examples have been provided, to illustrate the concepts, and to demonstrate their relevance to the performance evaluation of protection schemes.
